Tennessee

[59-2 USTC
¶9501]Coleman H. Dykes v.
Burton
J. Gerhardt, et al.
Chancery
Court, Knox County, Tenn., No. 35,024, 9/3/58
Priority of liens.--County and city tax liens which had become
fixed and specific before the filing of the Federal government's tax
lien, and a mortgagee's lien which had been recorded prior to the filing
of the Federal government's tax lien, were both entitled to priority
over the Federal tax lien.
Clyde W. Key,
Knoxville
,
Tenn.
, for Coleman H. Dykes. Charles E. Rader, Knoxville, Tenn., C. J.
Pursey, St. Louis, Mo., for Burton J. Gerhardt. Ambrose & Wilson,
Knoxville
,
Tenn.
, for R. T. Bales on intervening petition.
Memorandum
Opinion
DAWSON,
Chancellor:
In August,
1957, Clyde W. Kay filed a petition in this cause seeking to foreclose
on the realty involved, to enforce his attorney's lien in the amount of
$25,000.00. The question arising at this time is to determine the proper
priority of liens of the
United States
, Gerhardt,
Knox
County
, City of
Knoxville
, and Clyde W. Kay.
It appears
that as far back as 1946, Coleman H. Dykes and Burton J. Gerhardt were
partners, owning property located in the States of Tennessee and
Missouri
as tenants in common. In December 1946, they entered into a dissolution
agreement, whereby Gerhardt agreed to convey to Dykes his one-half
interest in the
Tennessee
property in return for a conveyance to him by Dykes of Dykes' half
interest in the
Missouri
property plus a payment of $15,000 to even things up. $5,000 was
actually paid to Gerhardt by Dykes.
On August,
1947, Dykes recorded a deed dated
November 18, 1946
, from Gerhardt covering some eight pieces of property, Gerhardt claimed
that this deed was a forgery insofar as it purported to convey the last
seven tracts listed.
Some time in
1951, this action was commenced by Dykes against Gerhardt to quiet his
title to all eight tracts against both the claim of forgery and against
the claim of Gerhardt that Dykes owed him $10,000 under the agreement.
Further, Dykes claimed his title had been slandered and sought damages.
This Court
originally determined that the deed was not forged and that Dykes held
fee simple title to all right tracts of land, subject, however, to an
equitable lien in favor of Gerhardt for $10,000. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals of
Tennessee
reversed in part and remanded, holding that the deed was a forgery and
that Dykes was not entitled to fee simple title until the $10,000 was
paid.
In the
meantime, however, tax liens in favor of the
United States
arose when taxes were assessed against Dykes on
June 30, 1952
, for $2,504.78, and on
November 17, 1952
, for $10,844.92. Notices of these liens were filed in the office of the
Register of Knox County on
October 27, 1952
, and
February 17, 1953
, respectively.
Since this
property is still owned as partners, two situations must be considered:
Under the first
situation, the petitioner, Clyde W. Kay, asserts that as to the
one-half interest owned by Coleman H. Dykes, the order of priority
should be as follows:
First:
Such County and City of
Knoxville
liens that had matured prior to the Government's first income tax lien
on
October 27, 1952
.
Second:
A lien of Clyde W. Kay under mortgage of
November 30, 1950
, to the bank of
Knoxville
against such property as is embraced in the mortgage.
Third:
The lien of the
United States
for income taxes.
As to the second
situation, the petitioner Kay asserts that the priority of claim
should be listed as follows:
First:
The lien of Gerhardt.
Second:
Kay lien.
Third:
Tax lien of
Knox
County
.
Fourth:
Tax lien of the City of
Knoxville
.
Fifth:
Tax lien of
United States
.
FIRST
SITUATION: As to the first situation, the Court is of the opinion
that both City and County tax liens which had become fixed and specific
before
October 27, 1952
, are entitled to priority. However, for the purposes of this suit the
Court cannot agree that the lien of Mr. Kay attached from the day of the
filing of the suit, which was in August, 1951, so as to have priority
over the claim of the
United States
. The reason for this is that the lien claimed by Mr. Kay is not a fixed
and specific lien. Such a lien is subject to be defeated by a failure to
obtain a recovery and it is subject to fluctuation in amount because it
must be based upon the amount of recovery. The determination of the
amount of the lien to make it specific depends upon future Court action.
Illinois Central Ry. Co. v. Wells, 104
Tenn.
706;
Butler
v. Givins, 137
Tenn.
438.
It has
definitely been held in the case of U. S. v. Security Trust &
Savings Bank of San Diego, 340 U. S. 47-53 [50-2 USTC ¶9492] and 95
Law Ed., U. S. Supreme Court Rep. Ann. at Page 53, that a lien which is
not specific or perfected will not prevent the priority of the United
States from applying to the entire property of the debtor, no matter
what the provisions of State law. In that case, the Court held that the
Federal lien was prior in right to an attachment lien where the Federal
tax lien was recorded subsequent to the date of the attachment lien.
In the case of
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. United States, 107 Fed.
(2d) 311 [39-2 USTC ¶9771], and in Federal Reporter, 2d Series, 107,
Page 313, it was held that even in the case of a prior recorded mortgage
the Federal tax lien would be entitled to priority unless the holder of
the mortgage file a bill in Chancery in the District Court for the
removal of the tax lien. This decision was based upon the holding that
at the time the lien of the
United States
arose, the mortgagor still had an interest in the property. A strong
dissenting opinion was, however, rendered in this case.
In the case of
United States
v.
New Britain
, 347
U. S.
Page 84 [54-1 USTC ¶9191], 98 Law Ed. U. S. Supreme Court Rep. Ann.
Page 525, the Court held that where the City's or County's claim was
fixed and specific, that these claims would be entitled to priority.
This holding is based upon the principle that "the first in time is
the first in right", and City of
County
tax liens arising after the filing of the Federal lien are subject
thereon.
It therefore
follows that the priority of claims under the first situation must be as
follows:
First:
County and City tax liens fixed and made specific before the filing of
the Government's lien on
October 27, 1952
.
Second:
The lien of the
United States of America
for income tax.
Third:
Tax liens of
County
of
Knox
and then City liens.
Fourth:
The lien of Clyde W. Kay under the Bank of Knoxville mortgage dated
November 30, 1950
, now held by him.
SECOND
SITUATION: As to the second situation, the Court is of the opinion
that the priority of liens should be as follows:
First:
County and City taxes which were specific and fixed before the filing of
the Federal tax lien.
Second:
The lien in favor of Burton J. Gerhardt and wife.
Third:
Tax lien of the
United States
.
Fourth:
Tax liens of
Knox
County
.
Fifth:
Tax liens of the City of
Knoxville
.
Sixth:
Attorney's lien of Clyde W. Kay.
In regard to
the claim of the City of
Knoxville
to title to the fifty acre tract sold by tax sale, the Court is of the
opinion that the sale was invalid and should be set aside inasmuch as
the tax buyer in interest had no notice of and was not made a party
thereto. It would be inequitable to allow this tax sale to stand in view
of a forged deed, which the property owner had no notice of.
It is also
provided that in the case of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v.
United States, 107 Fed. (2d) 311 [39-2 USTC ¶9771], that the tax
sale of a municipality could not divest the interest of the
United States
unless the municipality follows the statutory provision for removal of
Federal tax liens. This does not appear to have been done and the City
sale is therefore of no effect and is set aside. However, the City is
entitled to file its claim for the taxes due during the intervening
years, subject to the pro rata of liens heretofore stated.